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INTRODUCTION: PROFESSOR RICHARD EPSTEIN
BY THE HONORABLE JACK B. JACOBS*
I am honored to introduce this lecture, which was delivered at
Widener University School of Law, on October 25, 1996, by Richard
Epstein, who is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago. Professor Epstein appeared in
Delaware on that occasion as the first Distinguished Lecturer of the Court
of Chancery Historical Society, co-sponsored by the Historical Society
and Widener University Law School.
By way of background, the Historical Society was originally
formed in 1990 as an independent, non-profit organization to
commemorate the 200th anniversary celebration of the court of chancery.
That event took place in September 1992, and its proceedings have been
recorded elsewhere. Following that commemoration, the Society's board
of directors resolved to devote its resources to providing, from time to
time, a public forum on issues of institutional concern to the court of
chancery, which would include, but not be limited to, corporation lawv and
equity jurisprudence. The Distinguished Guest Lectureships are intended
to be that forum.
Although not a corporate law specialist, Professor Epstein is ideally
suited to be a guest lecturer. His work is prolific, interdisciplinary, and
unbounded by arbitrary lines of specialization. His thought process is
constrained by no orthodoxy, and his works involve subjects as diverse
.Vice-Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.
'The Business Lawyer chronicled a number ofnotable remarks made in connection with
the commemoration. See William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to the Delaware Court of
Chancery, 1792-1992, 48 Bus. LA\V. 363 (1992); Maurice A. Hartnett, Ill, The History of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 Bus. LAW. 367 (1992); William H. Rehnquist, The
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint J'enture of Providing
Justice, 48 Bus. LAW. 351 (1992); E. Norman Veasey, The National Court of Excellence, 48
Bus. LAW. 357 (1992). See also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of
the Delaware Court of Chancery - 1792-1992, 18 DE. J. CoRp. L. 819 (1993) (chronicling
the development of Delaware's equity court).
as Bargaining With the State (1993); Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment Discrimination Laws (1992); Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985); and, most recently,
Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995), as well as a forthcoming book
on health law and regulation. These works are buttressed by a long list
of law review articles and law school textbooks. Clearly, Professor
Epstein was, and is, recognized as a heavyweight in the world of legal
thought.
You may be interested to know how Professor Epstein came to be
the Historical Society's choice to introduce the Distinguished Lecture
series. That occurred by the most happenstance of events in which I was
personally involved. In 1994, while attending my thirtieth college class
reunion at the University of Chicago, I encountered a classmate and good
friend who is now a highly successful lawyer in Washington, D.C. That
friend, after an unsuccessful try at mathematics, attended law school at
the University of Southern California (USC), where he graduated first in
his class. One of his professors at USC was a (then) junior faculty
member named Richard Epstein, with whom he developed a long-
standing friendship. On a Saturday afternoon during the reunion, we
decided to tour the University of Chicago Law School. Once inside the
building, my friend suggested that we look up Professor Epstein. We did
so, and, to my considerable surprise and relief, the professor welcomed
us cordially into his office which was filled with stacks of paper, each
representing a different work-in-progress.
I spent the next hour and a half listening to the conversation
between my friend and Professor Epstein, which ranged over a multitude
of topics, both legal and personal. The experience left a deep impression,
as it confirmed in a very personal way Professor Epstein's reputation as
a deep thinker whose range of interests is almost boundless, and whose
mind generates at blinding speed original insights and unorthodox ways
of thinking about fundamental social and legal concerns and their
solutions. Indeed, by the end of our encounter, I felt as if I had run the
New York City Marathon.
When I related my experience to my colleague, Chancellor William
T. Allen, and to the Historical Society's board of directors, the decision
to invite Professor Epstein to Delaware was enthusiastic and
uncontroversial. Thereafter, Dean Arthur N. Frakt graciously concurred
in the proposal that Widener Law School cosponsor the lecture. All
concerned were pleased that Professor Epstein accepted the invitation,
which he viewed as an opportunity to add yet one more legal area to his
considerable repertoire. As evidenced by the manuscript that now
follows, our legal community has been enriched greatly by Professor
Epstein's presence.

CONTRACT AND TRUST IN CORPORATE LAW:
THE CASE OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY'
BY RICHARD A. EPSTEIN"
Of Broad and English Principles. For most of my academic career
I have written extensively in areas in which I neither teach nor practice.
Corporate law is one of those fields that I have followed at a distance,
but in which I nonetheless on occasion write. From this simple
confession, two questions might be asked: first, why the Court of
Chancery Historical Society should invite me to speak at its Distinguished
Guest Lectureship when there are, almost by definition, a large number
of gifted (if nameless) corporate scholars to whom they could have
turned; and, second, why I have followed the consistent policy of straying
into areas where I have no discernible expertise. I do not confess to any
ability to answer the first question, although I thank Chancellor Allen and
Vice-Chancellor Jacobs for inviting me to speak on this occasion, and I
thank the vice-chancellor for his most gracious introduction. But I will
talk directly to the second question, for the answer to it relates to the title
of this talk and to my willingness to comment on what I think to be one
of the central issues of corporate law: the relationship of contract and
trust theory to the governance and operation of corporations.
Accordingly, I shall begin my remarks at a general level and then apply
them to the doctrine of corporate opportunity as developed in Chancellor
Allen's instructive opinion in the difficult case of Cellular Information
Systems, Inc. v. Broz.'
Over the years my dominant intellectual mission has been to use
the common law categories of property, contract, tort, and (I will add)
restitution to explain the larger and more complex social arrangements
under which we all live.' My interest in this grand theme stems in part
from my taste for philosophical speculation, and in part from my own
educational background. I was raised originally in English law and,
therefore, learned something about the ins and outs of chancery practice
.This article is a revised version of the talk presented as the Inaugural lecture for the
Delaware Historical Chancery Society on October 25, 1995, at Widener University School of
Law, Wilmington, Delaware.
-James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago.
'663 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1995).
2On which, see generally, RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, SINPLE RULES FOR ACOMPLEX WORLD
(1995) (explaining how adherence to these basic principles of the lawv can aid people in
organizing their affairs within a convoluted social fabric).
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in the nation that gave birth to the systematic distinction between law and
equity, and which still lends greater recognition to those differences in its
day-to-day operations. In addition, the standard English model of legal
education, at least when I was a student at Oxford, was organized around
a few fundamental categories, each of which contained a very large
portion of legal territory. The balkanization of the curriculum, which is
in part a consequence of the course system in the United States, had not
(at least as of thirty years ago) run its course in England. I was, therefore,
accustomed to treating torts as covering everything from a punch in the
nose to a trade dispute between rival firms, or to a struggle between
employers and their unionized workers. Contracts, for its part, covered
everything from the niceties of offer and acceptance for the sale of a loaf
of bread to contracts for the purchase and sale of world-wide corporate
businesses. That comprehensive view of the legal universe reveals no
obvious fault-line between public and private disputes, or even between
big and little ones. There is simply a relatively small body of cohesive
legal principles - promise, harm, interest, causation, benefit - that in
various combinations apply over and over again to a wide variety of
situations that look less diverse once their intellectual origins are well
understood.
The second reason why I believe in the intrinsic unity of the law
dates from my own foray into constitutional law - another area that I do
not teach - culminating in my book Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain (1985). There I argued in a most contrarian
manner that the bedrock common law relationships between private
individuals form the indispensable foundation for understanding the
proper sphere of government regulation in the modem age, whether or
not compensation is offered. The law of property, tort, contract, and
restitution offer in my view the only coherent way in which to understand
the legitimate scope and limits of constitutional power by which to make
sense of our own constitutional order. After all, how can one make sense
of a clause that speaks of "impairing the Obligation of Contracts"3
without knowing what constitutes a contract, or find out what is the
proper scope of the police power unless one can give a coherent account
to the private law of nuisance? As recent decisions seek to grapple more
conscientiously with the scope of government power, the role of these
concepts in public debate grows larger. It is only when the severance of
public law from its common law roots is complete that the modem state
can acquire its huge repository of power.
3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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The External and Internal Lives of the Corporation. The same
difficulties I think complicate the proper analysis of corporate law, for
corporations often lie at the intersection of public and private law. Thus,
it is often said that a corporation is a creature of the state that grants it
a charter and offers it the protection of limited liability from general
creditors. The power in question is said to justify imposing restrictions
on corporate operations. As that is the case, the intimate connection
between public and private law in the corporate context should be
apparent.
The issue becomes even more sharply focused when it is realized
that most of a corporation's affairs can be divided into two large
categories: the first of these deals with the external relationships of the
corporation to the rest of the world; and the second deals with the
internal affairs of the corporation, i.e., the way in which the corporate
participants - shareholders, directors, officers, and perhaps bondholders
and contractual creditors - organize their cooperative venture among
themselves within the capacious mantle of limited liability that guards
against outside attack unless waived explicitly by agreement.
There is little doubt in my mind that the membership and the form
of the corporate community is heavily shaped by the presence of limited
liability. After all, it is this doctrine that allows people to enter and exit
corporate ventures without having to run the risks of being held
vicariously responsible for the actions of their servants, the corporate
officers. But here I plan to ignore the fruitful discussion of interactive
effect, because, in this talk at least, I wish to concentrate on the question
of internal relationships defining how the various members of the
corporate community organize their lives among themselves. Not
surprisingly, it is just at this juncture that the law of contract moves to
center stage; for the first, naive, and indeed correct answer to this
question is that the internal affairs of the corporation are - or more
accurately, should be - settled by contracts among its members. But to
that answer there comes the next question: if this were all that there was
to the law of corporations, then we could not distinguish between a
contract for the sale of bread from a contract to form a corporation to
make communications software. After all, if a contract's terms are
strictly and solely a matter for determination between the parties, why
bother to distinguish between these two types of deals in the first place?
Why, in other words, have a separate body of corporate law at all?
Indeed, why have a court of chancery dedicated to dealing with
corporations in equity? Indeed, why have this lecture?
Relational and Spot Transactions. The answer to the above
challenge cannot be found in the law of offer and acceptance, in the law
19961
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of consideration, in the law of fraud, conditions, or frustration or mistake
or impossibility, for each of these areas of law applies in its own way to
the routine sale as well as to complex corporations. Just because a
transaction involves only a few dollars does not mean that it is easy to
disentangle all the blunders, mistakes, duplicity, and misfortune that go
into creating a delicious legal mess. The answer, therefore, has to lie
elsewhere; and it lies in the nature of the transaction as perceived by the
parties to that relationship.
The first great divide is between relational and spot transactions.
By spot transactions, I mean those that contemplate a transfer of title or
the performance of a discrete bundle of services which can be performed
in a compact span of time. In contracts such as these, each party desires
to possess what the other owns, and each is prepared to part with what
he owns in order to obtain it. Generally speaking, the cleaner and
quicker the deal, the happier and wealthier its participants. The normal
sale of a house does not contemplate a period of years when the buyer
and seller share the premises. And, if it does contemplate a mortgage to
purchase the property, the prompt payment of the monthly bill keeps the
two parties securely fastened on their separate courses. Each one, in
effect, wishes to conduct his own affairs with the same independence
after the transaction was entered into as before, and the contract
provisions are typically drawn to preserve for both the requisite degree
of independence before and during the transaction. In the limiting case,
one has a cash sale in which the near instantaneous transfer of assets
marks the successful completion of a transaction that offers mutual gain
to both parties.
The mortgage example, however, shows that a second divide is
needed in order to complete the analysis. It is simply not sufficient for
understanding corporate transactions to rely exclusively on the key
distinction between spot and relational transactions. To be sure, a
corporate deal is not a spot transaction, but, by the same token, it cannot
be said that all relational transactions are typical or corporate or, to edge
closer to our subject, trust relationships. Thus, so long as the mortgage
is not in arrears, the relationship between the parties is judged by strict
legal rules that permit no degree of advantage taking by either side.
Indeed, one reason why mortgages are typically assignable and often
assumable is that the personal identity of the parties is of no consequence
when prompt mailing of a monthly check prevents the triggering of any
and all other obligations. The usual calculations on mortgages do not
deal with governance questions or fiduciary responsibilities. Typically,
they are concerned with packaging of financial incidents - prepayments
to avoid high interest rates and the like.
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Once, however, the arrangement falls into default, then an element
of trust comes into play because an element of discretion necessarily
comes into the picture. Someone has to decide whether possession of the
property moves from borrower to lender, someone has to organize the
sale and decide whether to take an early bid for less or to hold out for
more; someone has to resolve conflicts of interest between the mortgagor
and mortgagee. So, here we move closer to a fiduciary duty. Yet, for
two reasons we have not quite reached the limit of the pure fiduciary case
of importance in the corporate context. First, it is clear that mortgage
foreclosure does not contemplate a long-term relationship between the
parties, save by necessity. The object of the game is still to disentangle
the interests as quickly as possible so that both parties can go their
separate ways. Second, the lender has no duty of loyalty that requires it
to put the interests of the borrower first. To be sure, the borrower's
welfare counts, but only after the lender has been able to collect
principal, interests, and costs.
The Consensual Origins of the Trust Relationship It is this last
element that distinguishes the foreclosure situation from the trust
relationship arising in the corporate context. Discretion that affects the
welfare of another individual is not quite what is needed to make a trust.
What is needed is an additional element: the beneficiary of the
arrangement is conceived of as largely passive (until required to sue to
protect his own rights), and the party bearing the trust has to exercise
discretion in a way that works to the exclusive advantage of the holders
of the beneficial interest. Accordingly, in the cleanest of all situations,
the trustee's sole compensation comes from either a fixed payment or
some other compensation formula (e.g., a fee based on performance of
a stock fund). Unlike the mortgage situation, the trustee is normally
required to put the beneficiary first; in some cases, he cannot even put
himself second. The issues that arise around this conception are two.
The first asks, how does this particular duty arise? The second asks, how
is the duty carried out in particular circumstances?
Trust and Consent. Turning to ihe first issue, it seems clear that
the dominant category of analysis should be that of consent. In most
cases of corporate formation, there is little concern about the welfare of
third parties: corporations are not organized to bomb innocent
individuals, and the competitive harm that they inflict on their rivals is
the necessary price to advance first consumer and then overall social
4On which see, John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE W. 625 (1995) (viewing its contractarian character as the defining aspect of the trust
relationship).
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welfare. Similarly, the usual problems of formation that deal with
incompetence, fraud, nondisclosure, and the like can be handled by
standard contract doctrines that apply to formation without going to the
question of what kinds of terms these parties want. The basic insight,
which bears constant repetition, is that the corporate arrangement, like all
other voluntary arrangements, has to satisfy the usual contractual
condition: the deal has to work ex ante for the mutual benefit of the
parties. The challenge, therefore, is to figure out how the usual concept
of fiduciary duty fits within this overall account of joint contractual
egotism.
One way to see the transition is to note one path for the formation
of corporations and other forms of associations. Earlier I noted that the
simple form of spot transaction was the ordinary conveyance in which the
risk of ownership was exchanged for cash in transactions calculated to
allow both parties to operate independently on closing. But, a much
more complicated transaction is one in which a partial interest in a
particular property is sold by "A" to "B," and A retains the interest that
is not sold. Here the details of differences between joint tenancies and
tenancies in common are not of concern. Rather, central to the inquiry
is how do two equal partners share in the management of their common
property. Rules that are as specific as those which govern the payment
of a mortgage may form part of the overall plan. Yet, these usually will
not be sufficient, given the unforeseeable contingencies to which the
parties will have to respond. At some point concrete rules will have to
give way, or at least share the stage, with other rules of a more general
and diffuse nature.
Here, the good news is that it is possible to give an abstract answer
for the dilemma posed by divided control. The bad news is it is not
possible to apply that rule with the same rigor with which it is
announced. The grand generalization is this: each part owner of the
property has to make decisions as if he were the owner of the entire
property. The point of the rule is to ask each person to treat the welfare
of the other as having equal dignity with his own; for if that rule is
followed, then the two part owners will have effectively neutralized the
conflicts of interests that come between them.
Yet, even if that rule is followed, it cannot bring about a perfect
concordance of wills. It may well happen that A, as sole owner, would
make a different decision with respect to the property than B, and that
both would be acting in good faith although they chose to make different
decisions with respect to the interests of their common venture. The
differences in outcome may stem from different estimations as to the
likely consequences of alternative decisions, the way in which the
[Vol. 21
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treatment of a single piece of property ties in with the overall portfolio
of assets possessed by each partner, or differing attitudes toward risk
depending on, for example, age or wealth. The fundamental norm is at
best a test, albeit a powerful one, that allows a court to rule out some
decisions of a joint owner on the grounds that they are not compatible
with his obligation as a joint owner. But the test cannot eliminate honest
divisions of opinion between the two parties.
So, what then is done in these cases? Explicit contracts often
require the element of good faith and then refuse to impose further
restrictions that cannot be sensibly enforced by extra judicial proceedings.
In essence, the parties know - or will quickly come to know - that
their best protection against the inconsistencies of tastes and temperament
lies in their ability to select co-owners whose tastes and attitudes are
compatible with their own. It becomes pointless to try to find or draft
any form of language to do the impossible. The margin on which most
movement should take place is in the selection of partners and not the
selection of contract terms. Most people know this. They pick the
partners first and worry about the contract later, not the other way
around.
Thus far, the analysis of the move from conveyance to governance
has confined its attention to the two party transaction. It is important,
however, not to neglect the most salient feature of this relationship. In
cases of honest conflict, there is not a wide choice of decision rules: a
default rule for ties is surely needed unless and until one party is given
a majority interest in the business. In principle, people can arbitrate their
disputes, but resorting to that method is a way of winding up business,
not of conducting an ongoing relationship. So, once again, the best way
to avoid stalemate is by picking a partner who is likely to agree with
your views and to hope that changed circumstances do not alter that
estimation for the worse.
Many corporations, however, involve conveyances by three or more
individuals to a common venture. In this setting, the problem of joint
control can be resolved in ways that are not usually available to the
ordinary two person partnership. Thus, one key decision is to say that
only a subset of the joint venturers will make the decisions about the
ongoing control and use of corporate assets. This ostensible departure
from the democratic ideal of "one man, one vote" strikes me as a wise
decision because it reduces the information burdens on the passive
contributor to the venture. As a shareholder or limited partner, I know
I need to focus only on the decisional capabilities and preferences of the
set of probable directors and officers. By the same token, I know I do
not have to worry about the abilities and tastes of the large number of
1996]
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nameless shareholders in whom I would place no confidence and who, if
asked, would surely return the compliment. They would want me out of
the management picture, just as I would want them out. Passivity is a
reciprocal relationship with important, if hidden, virtues.
But what about those individuals who do take active control
positions? What kinds of duties do I want to place on these managers,
and what kinds of obligations are they prepared to assume? Well, the
problems of foresight over the future are not eliminated because the
venture is more complicated than before. Hence, the subtle
transformation from conveyance to contract (e.g., from sale of property
to contribution to joint venture) that marks the shift from conveyance to
partnership carries over to these more complicated corporate settings.
And with that transformation, the same pair of ambiguities surfaces once
again. On the one hand, I would like the managers of the business to
take into account my welfare, just as I would for myself. Since they are
paid for their services, I would not want them to maximize their own
benefit from the business, save to the extent that they also occupied a
shareholder role. So, the duty of loyalty seems to me to be a very
accurate implication from the realities of corporate life.
So too does the duty of diligence. People are paid to exercise
good care, not to be negligent. There could well be some question as to
what sanctions are applied in dealing with breaches of these duties. Just
to state the question is to show how difficult it is to resolve it. If the
consequences of breach are made too high, good people will shun the job
unless they receive more compensation than sensible shareholders want
to pay. If the duty is made too lax, the performance levels of the
managers will deteriorate. So we know that we can be too tough or too
lenient. Thus, we cannot state where the optimal level lies, leaving us to
use such words as "good faith" and "reasonable" to indicate our faith in
that optimum middle point whose existence is abstractly known but
whose place cannot be specifically defined.
It is ofjust such humble and recurrent considerations that the entire
fabric of fiduciary duties is borne and continues to hold such salience
today. And, here, if one looks at explicit contracts, they may be quite
precise on matters of detail; but, in the end, the limits imposed by the
problem are unable to eliminate the irreducible slippage between general
principle and the concrete case. So long as a contract term contains the
words "good faith" or "reasonable," it cannot be regarded as falling in a
different universe from a default provision that relies on the same
terminology.
So, the good news and the bad news come together in an
instructive way. The good news indicates that we should search for that
[Vol. 21
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optimal middle path. The bad news is that we will never be able to set
out its contours in indelible ink. It is all a matter of approximation from
easy to hard cases in a world in which the difference between express
terms and default provisions is less significant than it is in other cases,
such as setting the price in a contract of sale. In saying this, I do not
mean to suggest that contracts cannot be improved to reflect or repudiate
judicial decisions. In fact, the corporate bar is stunningly astute in
developing contractual language to protect against various forms of
difficulty that do arise. For instance, think of the speed at which
covenants were formulated to protect bondholders against loss in value
in the course of mergers and takeovers. The recognition that some
residual uncertainty exists does not mean that its scope cannot be reduced
by careful drafting. Oftentimes, it depends on how late in the day we are
forced to resort to conceptions of reasonableness and good faith. But, it
hardly follows that these terms should be the exclusive tools of analysis
just because they are at times indispensable tools of decision.
Is the Duty of Loyalty Waivable: The Case of Corporate
Opportunity. Thus far I have not raised any unduly controversial
weaknesses. But one key question looms around the comer. The duty
of loyalty is bome of contract and consent. But, are its terms so
important that they are included in each and every corporate arrangement,
or are the terms subject to variation by the agreement with the parties?
It is commonly understood that duties of care can be altered by
agreement with directors and managers. But, there is far greater
reluctance to make any duty of loyalty waivable in similar fashion.
Instead, it is widely assumed in many states that the duty simply goes
with the territory. Once individuals have assumed a corporate office,
they cannot disclaim by separate covenant or agreement the obligation of
loyalty to the firm.
In my view, this position is mistaken or at least overstated. To be
sure, there are very few occasions where shareholders would consent to
the appointment of a director where the contract allows looting of
corporate assets for private gain. The shareholder/director relationship
has to satisfy the mutual gain condition of all contracts, and it hardly
looks as though the looting contract meets that specification. Hence, it
is easy to develop an ideal of nonwaivable or categorical duties in
settings where no market or business considerations push in the opposite
direction. But, it may well be a mistake to assume that all duties of
loyalty should have this nonwaivable characteristic. In order to show
why even the duty of loyalty should be regarded as a default obligation,
it is useful to consider one class of decisions of great importance in this
regard: the case of corporate opportunity.
1996]
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The doctrine of corporate opportunity is a standard part of
corporate law in and out of Delaware. At its most general level, it says
that a director or an officer of a corporation cannot divert to himself
opportunities directed to the corporation. The basic instinct is that certain
opportunities should be treated as though they were the property of the
corporation and that any decision by an officer or director to convert the
corporate opportunity to a private one should be treated like a
misappropriation of corporate assets. And if there is no reason to allow
looting of the corporation, then the prohibition against converting a
corporate opportunity makes good sense, not only as a default provision,
but also as an absolute that cannot be varied by agreement.
The Prior Case Law. To set the stage for the analysis, it is useful
to begin with several early cases. First, in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime &
Stone Co.,5 a corporation had a one-third interest in a limestone quarry,
an option to acquire a second third, and the possibility that it just might
purchase the last third. Certain directors and shareholders, however,
purchased the last two pieces of the mine. Their actions were held to
violate the corporate opportunity rule with respect to the second piece but
not the third piece. The first part of the decision seems correct. Indeed,
one does not need an explicit doctrine of corporate law to respond to
what appears to be an interference with a preexisting contract. But, the
court held that the mere expectation for the last piece did not count
because it was not borne of contract.
That result seems wrong as a matter of first principle. Here, there
is not simply competition for resources between the corporation and the
directors, but competition for resources that have clear synergies with
properties already owned and possessed by the corporation. Stated
simply, the operation of the mine can surely take place far more
effectively under a single owner. Perhaps an outsider could frustrate that
plan by seeking to acquire the third piece, but it is highly unlikely that
a corporate director should be given that slack.
Once a director completes such a purchase, he then occupies a
position that is, at least in part, adverse to that of the corporation. As he
seeks to gain a larger share of the common venture, he will be armed in
any negotiations with knowledge that he has about the internal operations
of the corporation. That knowledge could prove of immense assistance
in negotiating over the operation of the mine or the divisions of the
spoils. Within a contractual framework, the total gains for the
'28 So. 199 (Ala. 1900).
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corporation and the directors seem smaller with that divided authority
than without it.
Otherwise stated, if the question is whether the gain to the director
from independently acquiring the last third interest in the mine is greater
than the gain to the corporation from unified management, then the
answer seems an unequivocal no. Corporate ownership avoids the
coordination problem at the back end and the possible misuse of
corporate information for private purposes. A director should, therefore,
be expected to waive his rights to acquire that interest even in a world
where the doctrine of corporate opportunity is not treated as a fixed and
invariable part of the legal universe.
In similar fashion, it seems virtually automatic to say that a
corporate director could not acquire, for example, the landlord's interest
in any lease where the corporation is a tenant. It is too much to require
the corporation to negotiate with one of its own. Whether one thinks of
corporate opportunity as a doctrine of contract or trust law, the outcome
in this class of cases seems to be pretty much the same. It would take a
powerful contractual agreement to reverse this understanding.
Second on my list of cases is Guth v. Loft, Inc.,6 which arose when
the president of a beverage company acquired for himself the formula and
trademark of the bankrupt National Pepsi Cola Corporation and, in fact,
sold some of its output to his employer. Guth did not raise an obvious
coordination problem - that is, Guth's ownership of the second business
did not create divided ownership of a common asset between him and his
corporation. But, the bankrupt corporation was in the same line of
business and, in fact, transacted with Loft. Now the information strand
of the earlier cases comes to the fore, because it seems quite likely that
Guth's decision to buy National Pepsi Cola and market its output
depended in some measure on the knowledge of the market that he
acquired as president of Loft. In addition, the ability to acquire National
Pepsi Cola for his own account would surely skew Guth's judgment on
whether it would be appropriate for Loft to acquire a firm that was in or
near its core business. Guth's job was to maximize the value of the
company of which he was president, and he could not do that well if he
had a side venture that operated in the same general domain. From an
ex ante perspective, there seems little doubt that the corporation could
have and would have asked him not to enter this side venture. So, once
again, in the absence of an express contract to the contrary, the decision
seems correct, and it remains a landmark in the modem law.
65 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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My third preliminary case comes out the other way. In Burg v.
Horn,7 the Horns had already been involved in the purchase and operation
of low rent buildings. They urged their friends, the Burgs, to invest with
them and, toward that end, the two families formed a corporation that
acquired several buildings on their behalf. All the while, the Horns
continued to acquire and manage other properties on their own account.
Here, the court held that no duty of loyalty was breached, and its
decision was correct. To be sure, any of the new ventures could have
gone into the corporation that was jointly owned by the two families, but
by the same token it was known at the outset that the Horns had already
developed several properties on their own. In that setting, it is most
unlikely that the Horns would agree to sacrifice their independence in all
future ventures simply because they opened one good venture prospect to
a friend. And, to announce a rule in advance that they had to abandon
their separate ventures would have been one sure way to keep the Burgs
out of real estate altogether. I have no doubt that the Horns did oblige
themselves to devote sufficient time and attention to the ventures under
common ownership. But, it seems highly unlikely that they agreed to
make the Burgs lifetime partners. Their differences in taste and attitude,
as well as their different levels of wealth, make it highly unlikely that all
deals were equally suitable for both families. After the fact, it is clear
that the Burgs had every incentive to announce their eagerness to
participate in ventures that have proved successful. But ex ante, the
understandings were likely to be quite closer to the Horns' version of
events.
So, how does one understand this case? One approach is to insist
that closed corporations and public corporations operate differently as a
matter of law. Just that approach is mentioned by Dean Clark in his text,
Corporate Law.' In it, Clark develops distinctions between public and
private corporations that make it far more likely that close corporations
will tolerate the relaxation of the corporate opportunity rules. His basic
argument is that it is far easier to customize deals in private corporations
and that these deals normally allow individuals greater freedom to pursue
independent ventures. He, therefore, proposes that the doctrine of
corporate opportunity be categorical with respect to public corporations
and selective to close corporations. At no point, however, does he
discuss the possibility that the duty of loyalty itself could be waivable.
Rather, he seeks to account for the variation between cases within a
7380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
'ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 7.3 (1986) (building upon Victor Brudney &
Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 997 (1981)).
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common legal category - directors and corporations - by redefining the
scope of a rule whose mandatory nature is, if only implicitly, accepted.
I agree with his basic attitude toward the close/public distinction,
but would rephrase the analysis to say that the default rule which imposes
broad restrictions on the uses of corporate opportunities should be
reversed because it does not ex ante maximize the joint interests of the
parties in close corporations. But since Burg v. Horn strikes me as a
common situation for energetic small businesses, I would not expect the
problem to be resolved mainly by abstract principles of law. Since most
successful individuals can stoke more than one fire at a given time, we
should expect to see express provisions that allow directors and officers
to engage in parallel adventures on their own.
I can recall that when I was brave enough to invest in private
limited partnerships in the late 1960s, the standard agreement contained
a waiver of the corporate opportunity doctrine allowing the general
partners to invest in other deals with whatever information they came by.
I signed those deals after a bit of thought because I knew that the general
partners were already in lots of deals and that it would be quite
impossible for them to figure out what bit of useful information came to
them in what capacity. I also knew that the capital invested by the
limited partners for this venture would be used fully in the development
at hand, so that any new opportunity would require fresh financing. My
gamble was that if I were interested in a new deal, the general partners
would come knocking at my door, although I knew that other partners in
other ventures might be asked first for reasons of friendship, experience,
wealth, connections, or other considerations. But, I was prepared to take
a business risk on this matter, and I never troubled to ask myself whether
it was allowable for general partners to waive the duty of loyalty. My
concern was not with the control of new information. It was with the
dedication of sufficient time to make this venture a success, even if it
were in competition with others that were under the management of the
same general partners. Even at a young age, I was prepared to live with
a certain level of ambiguity. It is in just this connection that the
contractual view of the duty of loyalty seems preferable to the trust view
of that doctrine.
Cellular Information Systems, Inc. v. Broz. Let me now turn to the
recent opinion issued by the Delaware Court of Chancery in what bodes
well to become a leading decision on the subject: Cellular Information
Systems v. Broz.' In a nutshell, CIS started life as a firm specializing in
9663 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1995).
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the acquisition and operation of cellular telecommunications systems
under FCC licenses in the upper midwest, chiefly in Wisconsin and
Minnesota.' Broz was one of its outside directors who also ran his own
company, RFB, which operated in the same line of business." RFB held
key cellular licenses also located in the upper midwest, mainly in
Michigan.' 2 A third company, Mackinac Cellular Corporation, owned a
valuable license for a Rural Service Area (RSA) situated midway between
these two systems on the Eastem tip of Michigan's upper peninsula.' 3
Mackinac was interested in selling this license to the highest
bidder. To this end, it retained the services of a broker, one Rhodes, who
approached Broz and his corporation in early 1994, presenting him with
a confidential packet about the station.' 4 At that time, CIS was in no
position to negotiate the purchase of any assets." It had just emerged
from a thankless and bitter bankruptcy struggle and was in the process of
liquidating its assets.'6 Mackinac did not consider it a rival, and neither
did Broz. For the remainder of the spring, there was some negotiation
between Broz and Mackinac, but no deal was reached.'
In the second half of 1994, the situation changed. While Broz
continued to negotiate with Mackinac, CIS was approached by another
company, PriCellular, which was also in the business of acquiring
licenses in the upper midwest to operate together with its existing
franchises.'" PriCellular eventually negotiated a deal whereby it
purchased the clear majority of shares (and through it most of the assets)
of CIS. 9 Concluding those negotiations reversed CIS's desire to unload
its own assets.2" Key to this case, PriCellular also had entered into an
option contract with Mackinac for the purchase of its license at $6.7
million.2' That option contained an escape clause for Mackinac, which
became operative if it could obtain an offer in excess of $7.2 before
midnight November 15, 1994.22 Broz eventually agreed to pay that price
Id. at 1182.
"Id. at 1183.
'
2 d.
"Broz, 663 A.2d at 1182-83.
'"Id. at 1184.
"Id. at 1182.
'
61d.
'
7Broz, 663 A.2d at 1184.
sAId. at 1182-83.
"Id.
2 See id. at 1183-84.
"Broz, 663 A.2d at 1184.
'
21d.
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on behalf of his own corporation.' As a consequence, all three parties
ended up in court. The key question was whether the doctrine of
corporate opportunity precluded Broz from making this deal, when (1)
Mackinac's offer did not come to Broz through CIS and (2) the harm to
CIS stemmed solely from its contract with PriCellular which was entered
into only after Broz began negotiations with Mackinac, but which
agreement was under active negotiation before the PriCellular-Mackinac
option expired.
The chancellor split the difference. For the first portion of his
opinion, he argued that the scope of the fiduciary duty in the corporate
opportunity area meant that Broz behaved improperly by proceeding
without notifying the board and without receiving its consent. His
decision, thus, breaks some new ground in the lav of fiduciary duties.
The question is how well the decision stacks up against the basic
principles set out above.
The chancellor's original point of departure is one that we can
generally accept: the doctrine of corporate opportunity clearly applies
when an officer or director of a corporation receives information in the
course of his corporate business which is then turned to his private use.
But at the outset, the chancellor's opinion obscures the question of
whether this doctrine has its origins in the law of contract or whether, as
part of the duty of loyalty, it comes as a nonwaivable command of the
positive law. We are told:
It is basic that service as a director of a corporation entails
the voluntary assumption of a duty of loyalty to the
corporation, and in some instances to the shareholders
directly. Broadly speaking this duty prevents or remedies
conduct in which a corporate officer or director uses her
power with respect to corporate processes, or property, or
her access to confidential corporate information, to
advantage herself in a transaction that is not entirely fair to
the corporation. . . . The classic corporate opportunity cases
involve instances in which officers or directors use for
personal advantage information that comes to them in their
corporate capacity, by diverting a profitable transaction from
the corporation. Such cases are simply a form of
misappropriation, not conceptually dissimilar from general
torts of that description.24
23id.
"Id. at 1184 (citations omitted).
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This passage gives rise to several observations. The opening
sentence reads quite well without the "voluntary" before "assumption of
duty." 5  Thus, it appears that the chancellor treats the duty as
nonwaivable, in part, because he cannot conceive of a set of
circumstances where rational parties would think themselves better off ex
ante by waiving the duty of loyalty and allowing officers to take
opportunities that might prove advantageous to the corporation. But,
there is some question as to the scope of the duty even in those cases
where the officer or director acquires the information in the course of
corporate duties. Thus, the breach of the duty is said to arise when the
"corporate officer or director uses her power with respect to corporate
processes, [etc.] in a transaction that is not entirely fair to the
corporation."26  The strongest case is one where the information in
question allows the director to obtain some advantage in a transaction
with the corporation, as in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.27 But,
a further question is whether the information can be used in competition
with the corporation to allow the insider to bid against the firm.
The rationale for that prohibition seems, in general, quite clear in
light of Guth. The information generated within the corporation is for its
purposes. The compensation given to the director or officer usually
comes in the form of stock or cash. Why allow that insider to take the
information and use it to raise the cost of doing corporate business? It
does seem intolerable that information generated by the corporation could
be used against the corporation, blunting the candor and openness needed
for collective deliberation. By way of analogy, the usual rules of
engagement provide explicitly that lawyers cannot use confidential
information to trade on corporate stock: a voluntary version of the
insider trading rule.
It, therefore, seems as though the chancellor is correct about the
basic corporate opportunity case. The blend between the inevitable
voluntary duty and the mandatory duty seems small enough. There is a
good reason for the stated ambiguity; for it is unlikely that any
divergence will take place between what the law requires under the trust
conception and what the parties want under the contract conception. In
the cases stated above, it looks as though the gains to the corporation
from imposing the duty exceed the losses to the director from obeying it.
The transaction seems to meet the requirements of mutual gain.
2 1d.
261d.
2728 So. 199 (Ala. 1900).
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In this case, however, there was no misappropriation of information
derived from the corporation. Recall that Broz got his information from
an impeccable and disinterested source: the broker for Mackinac who
wanted to maximize the price received for the sale of the cellular license.
He determined that Broz was an ideal candidate to complete the
transaction. Does this mean that one should assume that directors have
a duty to give to the corporation information that they receive from
outside sources? And, if they have to give the information, can they also
keep it to make use of it for their own benefit? Remember, information
is not like a barrel of wheat: a party can both give it away and keep it.
The value of what is retained is a function of what is given. So,
assuming that some duty exists, which way does it cut? Here we know
the preliminary answer of the chancellor, as indicated in the passage
quoted above: the wrong committed by Broz was both the failure to give
notice - which allows the corporation to use the information - and the
failure to obtain the consent of the corporation to go forward with the
information already possessed- which debars his use of the information
so obtained.
So, the possibilities that have to be addressed here are threefold:
first, the director can use the information like any private information;
second, he has to share the information; and third, he has to surrender the
information to the corporation and cannot use it himself. How does the
usual contractual assumption deal with this situation? A reflexive
invocation of the principle of loyalty might suggest that surrender is the
only answer. But, why should that be the case? Here again, Burg i,
Horn" is suggestive. Many successful business types have all sorts of
multiple ventures and cannot give exclusive loyalty to any of them. Here
one could argue that the correct position in the case was that taken by
Broz: I can use information that comes to me in my private capacity for
my own benefit and, it must be recalled, for the benefit of any
shareholders of RFB Corporation to whom I also owe fiduciary duties.
Should the scope of his duty depend on whether these persons do
exist or whether he was a sole shareholder? If anything, it looks as
though the broker did not expect him to relay the information to others.
He certainly would not spend the time filling Broz in on the details of the
offer, if he thought that Broz was powerless to respond to it, unless and
until obtaining the consent of CIS and/or PriCellular. So, we have yet
another wrinkle: if the corporate opportunity comes packaged by an
2380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
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independent third party as a private opportunity, then why must it be
turned over exclusively to the other side?
Another route leads to this same conclusion. Let us suppose that
Broz wanted to keep the transaction in the dark: would it remain that
way? Well, no. The person who has the key information about this deal
is the broker who wants to make a market. He has no obligation to Broz
not to communicate the circumstances of sale to CIS or to PriCellular.
In fact, that last feature makes the case even clearer. PriCellular had
purchased a partial lock on the deal: it retained exclusive rights to the
transaction unless Mackinac could find someone who will top its bid by
$500,000. Now suppose that the superior bid comes and the option
cannot be exercised. It hardly follows that PriCellular is out of the
picture. The clever broker is not under a duty to accept that higher offer.
He can treat it as a baseline for a fresh bidding and allow the chastened
PriCellular back into the competition. That can happen without Broz
doing anything in the situation. It only takes one phone call to
reestablish a stratospheric auction.
This possibility should give us some information about at least one
of our alternatives: is the duty that Broz has to CIS (and PriCellular) one
to communicate? In this situation, the answer seems to be no. Mackinac
can handle that part of the transaction by itself. So what about the other
alternative: requiring Broz to get consent to participate? Here one sees
real complications. It looks as though the doctrine of corporate
opportunity is now being used to suppress an auction that the third party
wishes to create and to impose real limitations on the freedom of Broz.
When he signed on as a director, knowing that he had other opportunities,
did he agree to so limit his activities that he had to put another
corporation first? And, did Broz assume the obligation to take into
account the interests of an acquiring corporation whose concerns
extended beyond those of CIS when he signed on? It does not seem so,
at least to me. What reason is there to believe that this restriction
maximizes the joint value from the ex ante perspective?
So, our evaluation brings the transaction around to the remedy that
is warranted. CIS lost out to Broz. Now, one possibility is to say that,
if consent was required to enter, then the proper remedy was to force the
resale of the interest in question for $6.7 million. After all, the damage
that was done to PriCellular was the loss of the option to purchase at that
value. We are simply using the corporate opportunity doctrine to restore
PriCellular to its former happy place. So, Broz loses the $500,000 lie
invested to top the earlier bid. But, the chancellor did not take that
position. Rather, he held that all CIS could insist on was the transfer
from Broz of his right to purchase the license, forcing CIS to pay the full
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purchase price - i.e., forgo the benefit of its earlier option. That
position only makes sense if the corporate opportunity doctrine requires
only notice, but not consent of CIS - a position inconsistent with the
basic thrust of the underlying duty of loyalty. What view of the
corporate opportunity doctrine makes it permissible for Broz to enter into
a spirited competition with CIS which would have to best his offer to
acquire the property? Loyalty seems to preclude competition.
If the duty of loyalty has nonwaivable teeth, then Broz's obligation
should have been to obtain consent to bid. Since that consent was not
obtained, damages should accrue for the full excess, at least if no other
party was prepared to enter the bidding at $7.2 million. After all, if Broz
had not bid, then PriCellular's lock on the deal would have been firm.
So it looks as though we can detect some manifest incongruity between
the remedy chosen and the ostensible nature of the underlying duty.
That disjunction, in turn, should lead us to return to the basic
question of law, which is whether the corporate opportunity doctrine
applies in this case. As I noted before, I think that this question has to
be answered from the ex ante perspective. Thus, the question
immediately must be asked: how far back in time do we have to go to
resolve the issue? My own inclination is to return to the moment that
Broz signed on as a director of CIS. If at that time he was engaged in
running his own cellular enterprises (whether or not in the form of RFB),
then I think that the answer is clear. To take a leaf from Brudney and
Clark, it is highly unlikely that any categorical duty should be imposed
on an outside director of a close corporation to forgo all other business
opportunities. It follows, first, that the duty should not be categorical,
and, second (though less clearly), that the original default position should
be set to allow Broz to pursue separate ventures. Although it is possible
to take the middle position, that the corporate opportunity doctrine sets
up a presumption in favor of loyalty that can be waived only by a clear
expression of intention, I don't think that this position captures the basic
realities as set out in Burg v. Horn. 29
But let us suppose that this is wrong. There is still the question of
when the duty of loyalty attaches. Here the best approach measures the
scope of the duty at the time that the external offer was made. In this
case, that event occurred in early 1994, when CIS was not in the business
of acquiring FCC licenses. If, as of at that time, Broz had changed his
position in reliance on his understanding that CIS was not in the picture,
then I think he was entitled to go forward with his negotiations even after
29380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
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PriCellular comes into the picture. The position here is little different
from the ordinary view of detrimental reliance. At the very least, Broz
seems to be entitled to recoup all his costs incurred in reliance on CIS's
indifference to the transaction prior to the time that he came under any
obligation to withdraw from the negotiation. But, the complexity of
deciding when the situation changes and what cash obligations arise from
the reliance render this position a distinct second best alternative. The
simpler solution seems better: once CIS is out of the picture, then Broz
can press on to the successful acquisition.
The overview of the possibilities in a particular transaction tells us
something about the use and limits of the two methods. Treating the
corporate opportunity doctrine as one based on nonwaivable trust
principles has the advantage of certainty, but, in the case of outside
directors of a close corporation, it has, in my view, the greater weakness
of rigidity. The rule does not seem to fit with the basic business realities
of the situation. Yet, once that fixed position is abandoned, it is no
simple matter to figure out exactly what the rights and duties are when
engaged in that formidable task of hypothetical reconstruction of
contracting alternatives from the ex ante perspective. Indeed, it is not
always clear how far back one has to go in order to achieve that exalted
ex ante status. So, in all these cases some degree of uncertainty will
creep into the proceedings; for it is easier to state the applicable
principles of joint maximization than it is to apply them.
Corporate opportunities arise in so many diverse circumstances that
it fairly invites interpretative difficulties when the terms of the
relationship of the director or officer vis-A-vis the corporation are not set
out in advance. This definition of the problem does not offer some
neatly packaged conclusion, but provides a set of shifting presumptions
that depend on the source of the information (inside or outside) and the
opportunities that the director is asked to sacrifice to serve the corporate
interest. The idea of a fiduciary duty is surely plastic at the edges, as this
extended discussion of CIS reveals. But, I do not believe that it should
be regarded as infinitely expandable. Nor does it follow that courts must
always fill in the gap; for, at least in cases dealing with the other business
ventures of outside directors, some express drafting should go a long way
to clarify the relationship before difficult cases arise. Yet, it is precisely
because contracts are not fully drafted that novel circumstances can lead
to difficult choices inviting the spirited legal discussions that keep the
intellectual juices flowing.
Editor's Note: Shortly before publication of this issue of the Journal, the
Delaware Supreme court issued its opinion in the appeal of Broz v.
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Cellular Information Systems, Inc.,3" one of the cases discussed by
Professor Epstein in the preceding article. Chief Justice Veasey, writing
for the three justice panel, reversed the chancery court's conclusion that
Broz had usurped a corporate opportunity belonging to CIS.
Approaching the case within the traditional contours of the corporate
opportunity doctrine as articulated in Guth v. Loft, Inc.,"3 the court
concluded that (1) a director's fiduciary obligations do not necessarily
require that all opportunities be presented to the board for its approval,
and (2) the fiduciary duties of a director of a target company do not
require presentment of an opportunity to the target company's board
when a potential acquiror has both the interest and ability to take
advantage of the opportunity.
3'The full text is scheduled for publication in the Atlantic Second Reporter and is
currently available on-line at No. 208, 1995, 1996 Del. LEXIS 105 (Del. Mar. 22, 1996).
35 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 1939).
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